Gateway To Justice: Constitutional Claims To Actual Innocence by Mourer, Sarah A.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 64 
Number 4 Volume 64 Number 4 (July 2010) 
Eleventh Circuit Issue 
Article 6 
7-1-2010 
Gateway To Justice: Constitutional Claims To Actual Innocence 
Sarah A. Mourer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sarah A. Mourer, Gateway To Justice: Constitutional Claims To Actual Innocence, 64 U. Miami L. Rev. 
1279 (2010) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol64/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
Gateway to Justice: Constitutional Claims to
Actual Innocence
SARAH A. MOURERt
"I believe it contrary to any standard of decency to execute someone
who is actually innocent."
-Justice Blackmun*
"[W]hat we have to deal with [on habeas review] is not the petition-
ers' innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitu-
tional rights have been preserved."
-Chief Justice Rehnquist quoting Justice Holmest
I. INTRODUCTION
Blind faith in the justice system might lead one to assume that a
trial in which constitutional rights are preserved would necessarily result
in a just verdict. In other words, if a court protects the accused's consti-
tutional rights, then no innocent man will ever be wrongly convicted. As
a result of new technology (especially DNA testing), however, it is well
recognized that innocent men and women are recurrently incarcerated
and convicted even in the absence of factual or constitutional error. For
the first time in history, the Supreme Court of the United States has
come close to recognizing this reality.
On August 17, 2009, Troy Anthony Davis's freestanding innocence
claim, unattached to any constitutional error or unreasonable application
of federal law, was remanded by the United States Supreme Court to the
Georgia district court for hearing and determination.' The Supreme
Court, however, did not release the district court from the restrictions of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
2
which requires Davis to show that the state court adjudication was based
t Sarah A. Mourer is an Assistant Professor of Clinical Legal Education at the University of
Miami School of Law, and former Assistant Public Defender for Dade County, Florida. Professor
Mourer directs the law school's wrongful convictions project and litigation skills program.
Professor Mourer wishes to thank David Freitas, Danielle Knecht, Craig Trocino, Amanda
Flannelly, Milton Hirsch, David Freitas, Dr. Stephen A. Mourer, Mary Mourer, and John and
Charlie Calli for their support in the writing of this article.
* Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 435 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 400-01 (majority opinion) (alterations in original) (quoting Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86, 87-88, (1923)).
1. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
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on an "unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law."3
Current case law and federal law are ill equipped to equitably cope with
compelling claims of actual innocence. Habeas corpus jurisprudence,
particularly AEDPA, is a haze of misleading obstacles for a petitioner
with an actual innocence claim. In short, because Davis's innocence
claim is unaccompanied by any other constitutional problems or errors
in his trial, the federal courts' hands may be tied by AEDPA in taking
action on his claim. Davis's innocence claim is convincing and forceful.
Yet AEDPA is drafted in a manner that presumes that a trial devoid of
any constitutional error or violations of federal law will never result in
the conviction of an innocent person.
Presently, a habeas corpus petitioner claiming actual innocence
must plead an independent constitutional error or error of federal law in
addition to the innocence claim.4 Such a rule is imprudent because the
execution (and arguably incarceration) of an innocent individual
undoubtedly violates the Constitution. Specifically, executing a factually
innocent person violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.5 As such, any petitioner presenting a col-
orable claim to actual innocence per se has satisfied any requirement to
offer a claim of a violation of federal law or constitutional error. The
Supreme Court in Davis could have explicitly found that Davis's free-
standing innocence claim met the requirements of AEDPA because of
the potential Eighth Amendment violation. The Davis opinion is, how-
ever, silent regarding the Eighth Amendment.6 The merits of finality and
comity must come second to the avoidance of the supreme injustice of
the execution of an innocent person. Nevertheless, the virtues of finality
are not vacant. The remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is equitable
relief at its core. The defendant seeking a hearing upon a writ is no
longer cloaked with the presumption of innocence because AEDPA
requires petitioners to show clear and convincing evidence of their inno-
cence.7 This standard promotes finality and will not overextend the fed-
eral judiciary or open never-ending petitions for habeas corpus.
We will examine the extent of wrongful convictions and the proce-
dural paradox that complicates any actual innocence claim. Specifically,
statutes attempting to insulate petitioners from constitutional errors or
the misappropriation of law fail to provide adequate safeguards against
wrongful convictions. DNA evidence and new technologies are expos-
ing more and more wrongful convictions every day, revealing innocent
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (d)(1).
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. VHI.
6. See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
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individuals who have had fair and impartial trials. We will then review
Troy Davis's case. Davis is a compelling example of a case in which all
constitutional errors (other than his actual innocence) have been
resolved and what is left is the glaring conclusion that he very well
might be innocent and on his way to execution. This article considers
how the state and appellate courts may have resolved Davis's motions as
well as Davis's second or successive writs under AEDPA, and explains
why AEDPA presents obstacles to petitioners asserting actual inno-
cence. This article also recommends to the federal district court mecha-
nisms under AEDPA that will provide Davis with relief. Specifically,
assuming it finds Davis's claim of innocence convincing, the federal
district court may: (1) find pursuant to section 2254(d)(2) of AEDPA
that the Georgia Supreme Court's decision was based on an unreasona-
ble determination of facts because it failed to provide Davis with an
evidentiary hearing despite volumes of new evidence; or (2) find that to
deny Davis a remedy in the face of a persuasive claim to innocence
would constitute an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus; or (3) find that the Georgia Supreme Court's decision was con-
trary to clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States under section 2254(d)(2) of AEDPA. Particu-
larly, to execute an innocent person would violate clearly established
federal law. The right to be free from wrongful execution pervades the
justice system, the Constitution, and the individual rights on which the
whole of criminal law rests. The prohibition against executing the inno-
cent is also found more definitively in the Eighth Amendment's right
against cruel and unusual punishment. 8 To execute a person with a com-
pelling claim to innocence would also shock the conscience sufficiently
to violate substantive due process.
Troy Davis has been on death row for over eighteen years.9 There
is no physical evidence against him. The murder weapon was never
found. The only evidence against him consists of witness testimony.
Seven of the nine witnesses recanted-most citing police pressure or
coercion. One of the only two non-recanting witnesses is suspected of
the murder himself and reportedly confessed to the murder. 10 Troy Davis
has never been provided an evidentiary hearing-until now." Will the
federal court interpret the law (AEDPA) as denying Davis relief because
Davis is not claiming that the state court made an unreasonable applica-
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. VUI.
9. For background information on the Troy Davis conviction, see Brenda Goodman, As
Execution Nears, Last Push from Inmate's Supporters, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, at A23,
available at http://www.nytimes.com2007/O7/15/us/15execute.html.
10. See In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
11. See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009).
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tion of federal law other than interpreting his claim to innocence as not
sufficiently credible to warrant relief? Under AEDPA, can a person be
executed based on a subjective but unreasonable state court assessment
of facts regarding guilt or innocence when a federal court, even the
Supreme Court, disagrees with that assessment? Federal review of state
court factual findings is not prohibited under AEDPA. 12 Federal courts
may find themselves positioned to reconsider the longstanding practice
of hesitating to review state court factual findings. The consequences of
such hesitation become apparent with the federal courts' refusal to
review state courts' factual findings (in the name of federalism and
finality) resulting in the incarceration and even execution of innocent
individuals.
II. THE EXTENT OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
Is what we know about wrongful convictions simply an interesting
but infrequently encountered problem? In his 2006 concurring opinion
in Kansas v. Marsh, Justice Scalia stated:
It is a certainty that the opinion of a near-majority of the United
States Supreme Court to the effect that our system condemns many
innocent defendants to death will be trumpeted abroad as vindication
of these criticisms. For that reason, I take the trouble to point out that
the dissenting opinion has nothing substantial to support it.
It should be noted at the outset that the dissent does not discuss a
single case-not one-in which it is clear that a person was executed
for a crime he did not commit.' 3
AEDPA is worded so as to limit the federal courts' role in protect-
ing defendants against constitutional error and misapplication of the law.
Justice Scalia is comfortable with this role for AEDPA because he
believes that these protections alone protect the innocent from wrongful
convictions.' 4 Yet the data relating to wrongful convictions lead to the
inescapable conclusion that once any constitutional or legal error has
been corrected, wrongful convictions do still result. Not only do they
occur, but they occur in statistically significant numbers. Nevertheless,
AEDPA clothes state court findings of fact with a presumption of cor-
12. AEDPA states:
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual
issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have
the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
13. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 188 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
14. See id. at 198-99 (arguing that most death penalty cases are reversed because of legal
errors and due process protections, not actual innocence).
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rectness and restricts federal court's power to correct wrongful convic-
tions. Would Justice Scalia assert that the federal judiciary cannot be
expected to correct human error, even human error that results in the
government-sanctioned and government-implemented execution of a
human being?
Justice Souter, in his Marsh dissent, noted that from 1977 to 2000,
in Illinois, thirteen prisoners sentenced to death had been released after
several of them were "shown to be innocent.""5 All thirteen had "rela-
tively little solid evidence" connecting them to the crimes. I6 During that
same period, Illinois executed twelve defendants.' 7 Souter even
observed that Illinois had "wrongly convicted ... more capital defend-
ants than it had executed."' 8 Ultimately, individuals are wrongfully
incarcerated, even those facing the death penalty and those who had fair
and constitutionally sound trials.
What we do know about wrongful convictions is only "the tip of
the iceberg."' 9 There have been at least 250 individuals exonerated post-
conviction by DNA; seventeen of these individuals were sentenced to
death prior to their exoneration and release."0 It is notable that DNA
samples are available in only five to ten percent of all felony cases.
2 1
Additionally, not every biological sample is tested.22 Consequently, the
wrongful convictions of which we are aware are only a small fraction of
the existing number of wrongful convictions. Some experts estimate that
wrongful convictions may amount to as many as five percent of all con-
victions each year.23 National estimates indicate that there are at least
15. Marsh, 548 U.S. at 208 (Souter, J., dissenting).
16. Id. (quoting STATE OF ILLINOIS, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 7 (2002), http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-reportsummary-
recommendations.pdf).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 208-09.
19. BARRY SCHECK & PETER NEUFELD, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, 250 EXONERATED: Too
MANY WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 1 (2010), http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/250.php.
20. Id. at 2, 12; see also Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989
Through 2003, 95 J. CRiM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523-24 (2005) (reporting that since 1989, 340
people have been exonerated after conviction of serious crimes).
21. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, REEVALUATING LINEUPS: WHY WITNESSES MAKE MISTAKES
AND HOW TO REDUCE THE CHANCE OF A MISIDENTIFICATION 3 (2009), http://
www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Eyewitness-ID-Report.pdf.
22. See id. (noting that many cases "will never have the benefit of DNA testing because the
evidence has been lost or destroyed").
23. See Suzannah B. Gambell, Comment, The Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors:
Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness Identifications, 6 WYo. L. REV. 189, 191 n.18 (2006) (citing
ELIZABETH F. LoFtns & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 4-1
(3d ed. 1997)) (noting that the 5% estimate may be high, and choosing instead to use a more
conservative estimate of 0.6%).
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10,000 wrongful convictions per year. 24 The total number of death row
exonerees to date is 138.25 Most wrongful convictions result from eye-
witness misidentifications, false confessions, and perjury.26 "Over 175
people have been wrongfully convicted based, in part, on eyewitness
misidentification and later proven innocent [by] DNA testing.
27
In the first eighty-two DNA exonerations, mistaken eyewitness
identification was a factor in more than seventy percent of those cases,
making it the leading cause of wrongful convictions in DNA cases.28
The current law surrounding suggestive eyewitness identifications uses a
due process analysis alone.29 The current law's procedural due process
view creates an inadequate rule, largely because it allows an eyewitness
identification into evidence even if it is suggestive.3" If a court finds that
a witness's identification is suggestive, but nonetheless reliable, the gov-
ernment may admit it into evidence.3'
In Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court used the reliability test it estab-
lished in its 1972 Neil v. Biggers decision.32 This test evaluates the cred-
ibility of witness identification to determine when a suggestive
identification nevertheless is admissible because it meets the test for reli-
ability.33 The Biggers Court enumerated five factors to determine if a
suggestive identification is reliable: (1) the witness's opportunity to
view the suspect; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy
of the description; (4) the witness's level of certainty; and (5) the time
between the incident and the confrontation, i.e., identification.34
In fact, the more suggestive an identification procedure is, paradox-
24. Id. at 190-91.
25. Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, http:l/
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
26. Gross et al., supra note 20, at 551.
27. THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 3.
28. Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 70 n.32 (2003); THE
INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 3.
29. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-98
(1972) (noting that procedural due process governs pretrial identification procedures); cf Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 150, 152-53 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that an alleged
violation of procedural due process challenges the adequacy of procedures provided by the State
or municipality in effecting the deprivation of liberty or property). See generally 16B AM. JUR. 2D
Constitutional Law § 958 (2010).
30. Sarah Anne Mourer, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Procedures Under the Fourth
Amendment, 3 DuKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 49, 60 (2008).
31. Id, at 61 (citing Manson, 432 U.S. at 114).
32. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200).
33. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. In Biggers, the Court admitted the identification of a suspect
based upon a voice and visual showup to the witness. It held that although the showup might have
been suggestive, it did not give rise to substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id. at
201.
34. Id. at 199-200.
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ically, the more reliable a witness will appear. 35 For example, if an iden-
tifying witness is advised immediately after a lineup that she identified
the suspect, she will report a higher level of confidence in her identifica-
tion.36 This report of confidence satisfies one of the Biggers factors and
will indicate reliability of the identification to a court when, in truth, it
may only be a reflection of the suggestion in the lineup procedure.37 In
fact, suggestive identification procedures result in witnesses giving
responses that indicate greater reliability of the identification on all five
of the Biggers factors.38 Consequently, the current law permits, not
infrequently, mistaken eyewitness identifications into evidence.39 How
frequently this occurs is difficult to ascertain. What we do know is that
eyewitness identification testimony compels juries to convict.4 ° Up to
eighty percent of the time, jurors believe witnesses who make eyewit-
ness identifications, regardless of whether the witnesses are correct.
41
On review, a federal court will not find constitutional error or misappli-
cation of the law, despite the fact that the defendant may have been
convicted on the basis of mistaken eyewitness testimony. An individual
convicted on the basis of mistaken eyewitness testimony will have no
remedy unless the witnesses recant or he falls within the five to ten
percent of cases with available biological evidence for DNA testing.42
Defendants who face mistaken identification, police-coerced con-
fessions, and faulty forensics may have constitutionally "fair" trials yet
be factually innocent.43 One recent article examines 137 convicted
felons who had been exonerated by later DNA testing. 4 All had been
convicted at trial using a reasonably wide range of false but "inculpa-
35. See Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures
and the Supreme Court's Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 1, 16-17 (2009).
36. Id. at 12.
37. Id. at 12.
38. See id. at 16-18.
39. Mourer, supra note 30, at 60.
40. Id. at 54.
41. Gary L. Wells et al., Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Human Performance in
Judging the Validity of Eyewitness Testimony, 4 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 275, 278 (1980).
42. See THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 21, at 3.
43. In Ex parte Blair, a Texas case, the Defendant, Michael Blair, was charged with the
capital murder of a seven-year-old girl after three eyewitnesses told the police that they saw him
in the park where the murder occurred. On appeal, the defendant sought DNA testing on
biological hair evidence proffered by the State that, while lacking probative value, was used in his
conviction. The testing, which excluded the defendant as a potential contributor of biological
evidence, did not occur until eight years after he was sent to death row. See Ex parte Blair, Nos.
AP-75954, AP-75955, 2008 WL 2514174, at *1-2 (Tex. Crim. App. June 25, 2008); The
Innocence Project-Know the Cases: Michael Blair, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/
MichaelBlair.php (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
44. See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009).
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tory" forensic evidence.45 Of the 137 exonerees, a review of the trial
transcripts revealed that invalid forensic science testimony was not only
common, but prevalent.46 The invalid testimony came from 72 forensic
analysts called to testify by the prosecution and employed by 52 differ-
ent laboratories, practices or hospitals from 25 states.47 In the absence of
DNA testing, a defendant's guilt or innocence is a subjective "factual"
assessment.
By most standards, and certainly by clear and convincing evidence,
Texas recently executed an innocent man. Todd Willingham was con-
victed and executed by Texas for willfully setting a fire to his home.48
State arson experts testified at Willingham's trial that Willingham
poured combustible fluid on the floors of his house and intentionally set
it on fire, killing his three children. 49 After Willingham's execution, the
Chicago Tribune, the Innocence Project, and the Texas Forensic Science
Commission all published independent arson reports indicating that the
state arson expert's testimony used to convict Willingham was unrelia-
ble.5" The Texas Forensic Science Commission engaged Craig Beyler, a
highly respected fire scientist, to study the Willingham evidence.5'
Beyler delivered a fifty-one page report that classified the methods and
procedures used by the Texas state fire experts as junk science.52
Because of cases like Todd Willingham's and progress in the area
of forensic sciences and technology, more and more wrongful convic-
tions are being exposed. DNA testing provides the primary source of
exonerations. Recall however, that the vast majority (over ninety per-
cent) of criminal cases do not have biological evidence suitable for DNA
45. Id. at 1-2, 15, 34-35.
46. Id. at 1-2.
47. Id. at 9.
48. Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (affirming the jury's
guilty verdict and the trial court's death sentence); David Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Execute
an Innocent Man?, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa-factgrann.
49. Willingham, 897 S.W.2d at 354; see also Grann, supra note 48, at 14-15 (contesting the
arson evidence analyzed in Willingham's case).
50. See Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Man Executed on Disproved Forensics, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 9, 2004, http://www.chicagotribune.comlnews/nationworld/chi-0412090169dec09,0,117380
6.story; THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, REPORT ON THE PEER REvIEW OF THE EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
THE CASES OF State of Texas v. Cameron Todd Willingham and State of Texas v. Ernest Ray Willis
3-4 (2006), http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/ArsonReviewReport.pdf; CRAIG L. BEYLER,
TEXAS FORENSIC SCIENCE COMMISSION, ANALYSIS OF THE FIRE INVESTIGATION METHODS AND
PROCEDURES USED IN THE CRIMINAL ARSON CASES AGAINST ERNEST RAY WILLIS AND CAMERON
TODD WILLINGHAM 45-51 (2009), http://www.docstoc.comdocs/document-preview.aspx?doc-
id=10401390.
51. See BEYLER, supra note 50, at app. A at A-I.
52. See id. at 45-51 (noting that the investigation "did not comport" with modem standards of
arson investigation").
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testing.53 Research shows that in twenty-five percent of sexual assault
cases referred to the FBI, the primary suspect was excluded by DNA
testing. 4 Without the advantage of DNA testing, the primary suspect
presumably would have been arrested and tried. Studies show that
approximately sixty percent of felony trials result in convictions.
55
These numbers suggest that without DNA testing, 15 innocent people
would be convicted out of every 100 sexual assault prosecutions.
56
There is no viable argument that these same estimates do not hold true
for the other ninety percent of criminal cases in which DNA testing is, in
fact, not available. Hence, a fair estimate of wrongful convictions in
totality is nearly fifteen percent. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia maintains
with dogged confidence that the Constitution's protections are sufficient,
insisting that the error rate for innocent persons in jail is 0.027%.57 It
forces us to wonder if Justice Scalia has misplaced the decimal point.
Criminal defendants who are convicted of crimes and who later become
exonerated by DNA evidence can nevertheless have trials technically
free of procedural error and misapplication of the law.58 Troy Davis's
constitutional claims have been resolved.59 His only claim left standing
is a compelling and persuasive claim to actual innocence.6 °
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY: TROY DAVIS
Friday night, August 18, 1989, in a Savannah, Georgia Burger King
parking lot, Sylvester "Red" Coles was harassing a homeless man, Larry
53. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
54. Peter Neufeld & Barry C. Scheck, Foreword to EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CONVICTIONS BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFrER TRIAL, at xxviii (1996), available at http://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf.
55. Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) - FAQ Detail, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=
qa&iid=403 (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
56. Sixty percent of twenty-five.
57. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 197-98 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
Joshua Marquis, Op-Ed., The Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23).
58. See, e.g., People v. Newsome, 443 N.E.2d 634 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (affirming defendant's
conviction and sentence to death, finding no constitutional error); State v. Winslow, 740 N.W.2d
794 (Neb. 2007) (holding that under the DNA Testing Act, relief is available to defendants
whether they were convicted following trial or convicted based on a plea); Ex parte Blair, Nos.
AP-75954, AP-75955, 2008 WL 2514174 (Tex. Crim. App. June 25, 2008) (granting defendant's
habeas petition only after he established that no juror could have reasonably convicted him based
on the post-conviction DNA evidence). All three defendants were later exonerated. See The
Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Michael Blair, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/
MichaelBlair.php (last visited May 5, 2010); Center on Wrongful Convictions, James Newsome,
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/ilNewsomeSummary.html
(last visited May 5, 2010); The Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Thomas Winslow, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/ThomasWinslow.php (last visited May 5, 2010).
59. See Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249 (11 th Cir. 2006).
60. See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009).
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Young.6' Troy Davis was present.62 Darrell "D.D." Collins was also pre-
sent.6 3 Someone hit Larry Young.6 4 Police Officer Mark MacPhail
responded. 65 Someone shot Officer MacPhail three times. 66 The police
had no leads until the following day when "Red" arrived at the police
station. 67 "Red" stated that he was present at the shooting and claimed
that Davis was the shooter.68 "Red" was accompanied by his attorney at
the police station. 69 From that point forward, all police investigation
focused on Troy Davis and exclusively Troy Davis."
A Georgia jury convicted Davis for the murder of MacPhail and
sentenced him to death. 7' The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed his
conviction and death sentence.72 Subsequently, his state habeas corpus
petition was denied, and its denial affirmed. 73 Davis then filed his first
federal habeas corpus petition, asserting Giglio,74 Brady,75 and Strick-
land 6 violations.77 Davis did not raise these constitutional violations in
state court; therefore, he confronted a procedural bar to raising these
claims.78 In order to overcome the procedural bar, Davis asserted actual
innocence pursuant to Schlup v. Delo.79 The merits of Davis's innocence
claim were not substantively considered; they served solely as a proce-
dural gateway to open the door for his constitutional claims.8" Davis's
constitutional claims were denied. That decision was affirmed. 8'








69. Goodman, supra note 9, at A23.
70. In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 828 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 813 (majority opinion) (per curiam).
72. See Davis v. State, 426 S.E.2d 844 (Ga. 1993).
73. See Davis v. Turpin, 539 S.E.2d 129 (Ga. 2000).
74. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972) (holding that the prosecution
has a duty to present all material evidence to the jury, and that presenting false evidence or failing
to disclose material evidence constitutes a violation of due process requiring a new trial.)
75. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984) (holding that the proper
standard to judge attorney performance under the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the
objective standard of "reasonably effective assistance").
76. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the "suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution").
77. ihz re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
78. Id.
79. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
80. In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 813.
81. See Davis v. Terry, 465 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006).
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Thereafter, Davis filed "an extraordinary motion" for a new trial in
state court, offering newly discovered evidence.8 2 Davis presented an
unusually large amount of new evidence. Yet it is important to note that
it was not the first time that Davis had pled the evidence. In Davis's first
federal habeas petition, he documented the new evidence in claiming his
innocence. The Eleventh Circuit made it clear, however, that Davis had
not made a substantive claim of innocence, but a procedural one.83 His
pleading of innocence in the first federal habeas petition was made for
purposes of opening the door for the merits of his constitutional claims
to be heard. This new evidence included:
(1) seven affidavits containing recantations of eyewitnesses who tes-
tified at trial; (2) three affidavits averring post-trial confessions to the
murder by... "Red" Coles... ; (3) several affidavits of persons who
had not previously testified who were either present at the scene of
the murder or in the general area immediately following the crime;
(4) two expert affidavits addressing ballistic evidence and eyewitness
identifications; (5) affidavits of jurors; and (6) a general cache of
additional affidavits.84
The state trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The Supreme
Court of Georgia granted Davis's application for discretionary appeal,
but ultimately affirmed the trial court's order denying his extraordinary
motion for a new trial.85 The court rejected the affidavits based on the
lack of credibility generally afforded recanted testimony, stating that
"[t]rial testimony is closer in time to the crimes, when memories are
more trustworthy. Furthermore, the trial process itself, including public
oaths, cross-examination, and the superintendence of a trial judge, lends
special credibility to trial testimony. 86 The Georgia Supreme Court was
influenced by the fact that one original eyewitness had not recanted his
testimony.87 This eyewitness was "Red" Coles-the same "Red" Coles
accused of being the shooter in affidavits.88 The Georgia Supreme Court
used the standard that the new evidence must be "so material that it
would probably produce a different verdict" at trial, and the court found
that Davis's new evidence did not meet this standard.89 The court's
opinion overlooks that, after presentation of Davis's current evidence, of
the nine original trial witnesses, only two eyewitnesses remained that
82. In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 814.
83. Id. (citing Davis, 465 F.3d at 1251).
84. Id.
85. See Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354, 357 (Ga. 2008).
86. Id. at 358.
87. See id. at 363.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 362-63.
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identified Davis.9" Of the two remaining witnesses, one is "Red"
Coles-a suspect himself.9 Three affidavits state that Coles confessed
to the killing.92 No one at this time contends that Davis confessed to the
murder.93 The second non-recanting witness is Steve Sanders who
admitted to the police that he would be unable to identify the shooter.94
Steve Sanders only identified Davis two years later at trial. 95 Affidavits
of the recanting witnesses recount pressure from the police to finger
Davis.96
Following the Georgia Supreme Court's denial, the Georgia State
Board of Pardons and Paroles rescinded its stay of execution and denied
clemency for Davis. 97 It stated that "[a]fter an exhaustive review of all
available information regarding the Troy Davis case and after consider-
ing all possible reasons for granting clemency, the Board ... determined
that clemency is not warranted."98
Subsequently, Davis filed a second federal habeas corpus petition
in the United States District Court, and the district court's denial was
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit99 In what
the Eleventh Circuit deemed an "actual innocence plus" requirement,
Davis's freestanding innocence claim was denied under section 2244 of
AEDPA.' ° The court unequivocally declined to interpret Herrera v.
Collins'°' as permitting a freestanding innocence claim on federal
habeas review. Quoting Herrera, the court in Davis noted "'for the sake
of argument in deciding [the] case, that in a capital case a truly persua-
sive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render
the execution of a defendant unconstitutional .... 2 The court noted
that claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence
have never been recognized absent an independent constitutional viola-
tion in the lower court's proceeding.' 013
The Eleventh Circuit found that Davis's claim did not meet the
90. See id. at 359-60; In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J.,
dissenting).
91. In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 827 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 828.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 827.
95. Id.
96. See Davis v. State, 660 S.E.2d 354, 359-60 (Ga. 2008).
97. In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 815.
98. Id. at 816 (alterations in original).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 823-24 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) (2006)).
101. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
102. In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 816-17 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417).
103. Id. at 817.
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requirements of section 2244(b)(2)(B).'" First, with regard to subsec-
tion (i), the requirement states that a successive habeas claim must be
dismissed unless "the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence."'1 5 The
court framed this question in terms of whether Davis could have, at the
time of his first federal habeas petition, discovered the evidence he
presented in his second habeas petition."° Davis did, in fact, plead his
newly discovered evidence reflecting his innocence in his first federal
habeas petition, but the court regarded the evidence as procedural pursu-
ant to Schlup to open the door to his substantive claims. Davis asserted
that he was, in fact, diligent in gathering the new evidence, and his dili-
gence is apparent because he brought forth such evidence in his first
federal habeas petition. °7 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument,
citing the language of the statute. 108 Section (B)(i) asks if the petitioner
could have discovered the evidence earlier.'09 Davis presented his new
evidence in his first federal writ; therefore, he did discover it earlier than
the filing of his second federal habeas petition. Consequently, the circuit
court found that the requirements of section (B)(i) were generally not
met.'
10
Second, the Eleventh Circuit looked to the requirements of subsec-
tion (ii), which states that a petitioner must "establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.""' The court found that this requires a showing of clear and
convincing evidence of actual innocence in addition to an independent
constitutional error." 2 The court used a literal reading of the statute,
going as far as to substitute the words "that petitioner is innocent" for
"constitutional error" in order to demonstrate that Congress did not
intend for actual innocence to suffice for the requisite constitutional
error. 1 3 The court contended that if "actual innocence" met the "consti-
tutional error" requirement of section 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii), then the statute
would need to read: a petitioner must "establish by clear and convincing
evidence that, but for the fact that the applicant was actually innocent,
104. Id. at 824.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i).
106. In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 819.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 820.
109. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i).
110. In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 822. The court did find that one of the affidavits (the affidavit of
trial witness Benjamin Gordon) did satisfy the due diligence requirement. See id.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)).
112. In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 823.
113. See id.
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no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense."' 14 The circuit court pointed out that such a reading
of the statute is nonsensical because a defendant is not found "not
guilty" but for his actual innocence; rather he should be found not guilty
specifically because of his innocence. 1 5 However, such a literal analysis
defies common sense because it is absurd to assert that the execution of
a factually innocent individual is not error. Playing word games with
statutes proves to be a risky business when the issue at hand is the poten-
tial execution of an innocent human being. It is fundamentally contrary
to the nature of the equitable relief contemplated by the habeas writ to
interpret its application with such rigidity. "The very nature of the writ
demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essen-
tial to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected." 6 As Judge Barkett comments in her dissent:
AEDPA cannot possibly be applied when to do so would offend
the Constitution and the fundamental concept of justice that an inno-
cent man should not be executed. In this case, the circumstances do
not fit neatly into the narrow procedural confines delimited by
AEDPA. But it is precisely this type of occasion that warrants judi-
cial intervention. 117
Yet the majority proceeded to conclude that, even if AEDPA con-
templated actual innocence as the type of constitutional error adequate to
permit the court to consider the merits of the petitioner's claim, Davis's
new evidence was insufficient to meet the clear and convincing stan-
dard." '8 This is conceivable only because the circuit court patently
ignored all of Davis's new evidence except one witness's affidavit,
which was not presented in his first federal habeas.' '9 Even on equitable
grounds, the Eleventh Circuit found all of Davis's evidence insufficient
to raise a concern that they were possibly sending an innocent man to his
death.
IV. ROADBLOCKS TO ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIMS
Even defendants who have many constitutional errors in addition to
their claims to innocence confront obstacles to having their petitions
heard. Many confront time bars or other procedural roadblocks like
Davis confronted with AEDPA. Schiup v. Delo addresses occasions
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 828 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969)).
117. Id. at 827-28.
118. Id. at 824 (majority opinion).
119. See id. at 822, 824 (discussing the affidavit of trial witness Benjamin Gordon).
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where a petitioner asserting actual innocence confronts procedural barri-
ers.12 0 Schlup filed a federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assis-
tance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to interview and call
witnesses who could establish his innocence.' 2' Schlup was procedurally
barred from raising his constitutional Sixth Amendment right to counsel
claim because of his failure to raise it on appeal in state court. 12 2 Schlup
was convicted of the jailhouse murder of a fellow inmate.' 23 At trial, he
relied heavily on a videotape showing him present in the lunchroom
sixty-five seconds before guards received the distress call.124 Therefore,
Schlup argued that he could not have committed the murder and made it
to the lunchroom in such a short period of time. 25 Prosecutors at trial
presented evidence that the guards were delayed in making the distress
call, thereby giving Schlup time to make it to the lunchroom after com-
mitting the murder. 126 Schlup's trial attorney failed to interview and pre-
sent John Green as a trial witness. 27 Green would have testified that he
made a distress call immediately following the murder.'
2 8
Ultimately, the Schiup Court relaxed the standard for a time-barred
defendant to file a second or successive federal habeas petition with a
claim to actual innocence. 29 Schiup requires that the petitioner must
show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable jury would have
found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the new
evidence. 30 If the petitioner meets these criteria, then the merits of his
constitutional claims may be heard. However, Schiup does not provide a
mechanism for a petitioner's innocence claim to be heard. The Schiup
standard assumes that if a defendant's other constitutional claims are
resolved, then an acquittal would be certain. The court inquiry depends
on the validity of Schlup's constitutional ineffectiveness of counsel
claim-not his innocence claim:
120. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
121. Id. at 306.
122. Id. at 306 & n.15.
123. Id. at 301-02, 305.
124. Id. at 303.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 304.
127. See id. at 307-08, 309-10 & n.21.
128. Id. at 307-08, 310 & n.21.
129. The Schlup Court adopted the standard espoused in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478
(1986), in which the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable jury
would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the new evidence. The
Schlup Court rejected the stricter standard from Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992), in
which the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional
error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner guilty. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 323-27.
Interestingly, later in 1996 AEDPA adopted very similar language to the language in Sawyer. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
130. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
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First, Schlup's claim of innocence does not by itself provide a basis
for relief. Instead, his claim for relief depends critically on the valid-
ity of his Strickland and Brady claims. Schlup's claim of innocence is
thus "not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through
which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred con-
stitutional claim considered on the merits."'
3'
This is precisely why the Eleventh Circuit in Davis is hypocritical
when asserting that Davis is procedurally barred under AEDPA (when
bringing a substantive innocence claim).' 31 He previously brought that
claim when he was unable to have the merits of the claim heard in his
first federal habeas under Schlup. Schlup explicitly treats an actual inno-
cence claim offered in connection with other constitutional error as pro-
cedural and not substantive. 33 Why is Davis not able to overcome the
procedural bar by showing manifest injustice under Schlup by the inno-
cence claim itself? In other words, under Schlup, Davis should substan-
tively be permitted to raise his actual innocence claim by procedurally
raising his innocence claim as a gateway to show manifest injustice.
134 If
a compelling claim to innocence that amounts to manifest injustice may
overcome other procedural bars, then why not this one?
As will be discussed, a convincing and persuasive claim to actual
innocence is undeniably a constitutional claim. 135 It is questionable
whether AEDPA codified Schlup. In that instance, section
2244(b)(2)(B)(i) would replace the Schlup standard. However, this posi-
tion is flawed. AEDPA essentially adopts the previous standard from
Sawyer.136 Consequently, not only would a petitioner need to meet a
burden in subsection (ii), but also in subsection (i). Thus, a petitioner
would need both clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitu-
tional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant
guilty of an underlying offense (subsection ii), and the factual predicate
for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the
exercise of due diligence (subsection i). Therefore, the gateway to have
131. Id. at 315 (footnote omitted) (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)).
132. In Davis, the Eleventh Circuit found that Davis was procedurally time barred from raising
his innocence claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) because he raised the new evidence in his
previous federal habeas petition. See In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 822 (11 th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
133. Id. at 314 ("Schlup's claim of innocence ... is procedural, rather than substantive. His
constitutional claims are based not on his innocence, but rather on his contention that the
ineffectiveness of his counsel and the withholding of evidence by the prosecution denied him the
full panoply of protections afforded to criminal defendants by the Constitution." (citations
omitted)).
134. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 314-15.
135. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 ("We may assume . .. that in a capital case a truly
persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional ...."); In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 828-30 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
136. See supra note 129.
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procedurally barred constitutional claims heard in second or successive
federal habeas corpus writs is arguably codified from Schlup in AEDPA.
However, it appears that the lack of a procedural error itself is a
requirement to meet the conditions of section 2244. The Schlup standard
is intended to overcome the obstacle of procedural errors. It is counterin-
tuitive to consider AEDPA as having replaced the Schlup standard. Fur-
ther, section 2244 does not, on its face, present itself as a mechanism for
overcoming procedural error or time-barred petitions. The statute solely
concerns "second or successive" petitions'37 and is meant to promote
finality and comity. 38 Accordingly, the Schlup standard makes sense as
the appropriate standard for petitioners filing second or successive fed-
eral habeas petitions and facing procedural bars.
AEDPA, particularly section 2244(b)(2)(B)(i), might be such a bar
faced by petitioners. If a defendant fails to timely present newly discov-
ered evidence,' 39 but that evidence meets the Schlup standard,140 then
the gateway is opened and the procedural bar overcome. In 2006, the
Court in House v. Bell reiterated its holding in Schlup, stating that "pris-
oners asserting innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims must estab-
lish that, in light of new evidence, 'it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt."" 1 This supports the position that the Schlup standard remains
the threshold to open the gateway to time barred constitutional claims, as
opposed to the clear and convincing standard from section 2244. Peti-
tioners who meet that standard may open the gate to the merits of their
otherwise-barred constitutional claims. The unanswered questions are:
What if the petitioner's barred constitutional claim is his actual inno-
cence, as in Davis? What if the defendant's only remaining claim is his
innocence?
V. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN DAVIS
Many courts are steadfast when it comes to their blind faith in the
judicial system and the belief that only constitutional error and mistakes
of law result in wrongful convictions. Such trust is so strong that Troy
Davis was never granted an evidentiary hearing for his post-conviction
affidavits at any level. Each court opined that his likelihood of inno-
cence was not strong enough to provide him an evidentiary hearing or
137. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(2) (2006).
138. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 318.
139. This might occur if a defendant does iot meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(i).
140. This might occur if in light of the new evidence, it is more likely than not that no
reasonable jury would have found the petitioner guilty. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
141. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327).
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remove his procedural bars 4 2 until the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled on Troy Davis's petition for writ of habeas corpus on
August 17, 2009. The Supreme Court remanded Davis's petition back to
the district court for an evidentiary hearing.'43 The concurrence noted
that no court had conducted a hearing to ascertain the reliability of the
scores of supporting affidavits to determine if they met the requirement
of "a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence.""' However,
the district court may be bound by the restrictions of AEDPA, particu-
larly section 2254(d)(1), which states that Davis may obtain habeas
relief only if he establishes that adjudication of the claim "resulted in a
decision that was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."' 45 Even if the
district court is persuaded by Davis's actual innocence claim, it may not
grant his motion unless the Georgia Supreme Court's decision affirming
the denial of his extraordinary motion for a new trial was contrary to, or
was an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or
Supreme Court precedent as required by AEDPA in section 2254(d)(1).
The aim of AEDPA is to promote finality and preserve judicial
resources by providing significant deference to lower court factual find-
ings. 146 AEDPA limits the federal courts' power by only allowing courts
to consider unreasonable applications of law or constitutional errors. 1
47
It purposely restricts the availability of the habeas remedy for petitioners
who seek continued and further factual review when such facts have
already been considered.
Davis presented considerable new evidence in his state motion for a
new trial.' 4 ' The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and
made subjective judgments regarding its credibility. In determining
whether Davis was entitled to a new trial, the Georgia Supreme Court
applied the following legal standard: whether or not the new evidence is
"so material that it would probably produce a different verdict."'49 The
Georgia Supreme Court made the subjective determination (based on a
review of the affidavits and documents) that the new evidence did not
142. See In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 824 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Davis v. State, 660
S.E.2d 354, 363 (Ga. 2008).
143. See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009).
144. Id. at I (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 827 (Barkett, J.,
dissenting)).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
146. In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 817.
147. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
148. See Davis, 660 S.E.2d at 358.




meet this standard. 50 The Georgia Supreme Court did not utilize an evi-
dentiary hearing in making this determination. In a federal habeas peti-
tion filed by a defendant in custody pursuant to a state court decision, "a
determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed
to be correct" unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness
"by clear and convincing evidence."' 5 1 The Court remanded the case to
the district court to assess whether Davis meets the clear and convincing
standard."5 2 In his concurrence, Justice Stevens stated, "The substantial
risk of putting an innocent man to death clearly provides an adequate
justification for holding an evidentiary hearing."' 53 Justice Scalia
denounced the notion that any claim based solely on actual innocence is
constitutionally cognizable, stating that "[t]his Court has never held that
the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has
had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he
is 'actually' innocent." 154 The district court will now evaluate and make
its own appraisal of Davis's new evidence and decide whether he meets
the requisite standard. The inquiry remains: What remedy can the dis-
trict court provide if it finds Davis's innocence claim persuasive?
VI. FROM FINALITY TO REALITY
Although the United States Supreme Court declined to affirma-
tively act on the merits of the Davis writ, the door is cracked for the
district court to act. If the district court is clearly convinced that Davis is
innocent, it must grant his writ. Under AEDPA, particularly section
2254(e)(1), in an original writ for habeas corpus, the factual findings of
the state court are presumed correct unless the defendant rebuts that bur-
den by clear and convincing evidence. The Georgia Supreme Court's
factual findings led to its conclusion that Davis's innocence claim failed.
We propose that if Davis can rebut these findings in the evidentiary
hearing, the federal district court is not powerless to grant Davis's writ
under section 2254(d)(1).
First, the district court may find that, pursuant to section 2254(d)(2)
of AEDPA, the Georgia Supreme Court's decision was based on an
unreasonable determination of facts because the state court failed to pro-
vide Davis with an evidentiary hearing despite volumes of new evi-
dence. Second, to deny Davis a remedy in the face of a persuasive claim
to innocence would constitute an unconstitutional suspension of the rem-
150. Id. at 358.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2006).
152. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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edy of habeas corpus in violation of the Suspension Clause. 5 5 Third, the
district court may find that the Georgia Supreme Court's decision was
contrary to clearly established federal law, as determined by the United
States Supreme Court. This is the standard required by section
2254(d)(1) of AEDPA, and it is the language that Justice Scalia believes
will tie the hands of the federal courts and prevent them from acting on
Davis's persuasive claim to innocence. 156
The question the courts struggle with is whether a claim to actual
innocence is a constitutionally cognizable claim in and of itself. The
answer is yes. The right to be free from wrongful execution pervades the
justice system, the Constitution, and the supporting right upon which the
whole of criminal law rests. The prohibition against executing the inno-
cent is also found more definitively in the Eighth Amendment's right
against cruel and unusual punishment.'57 To execute a person with a
compelling claim to innocence would also shock the conscience suffi-
ciently to violate substantive due process. 158 Therefore, a freestanding
innocence claim has independent constitutional significance on at least
three different grounds, each of which is supportable and clearly estab-
lished by the Constitution and the Supreme Court. Consequently, if the
district court is convinced that Davis has a compelling claim to inno-
cence, it is not restricted by section 2254(d)(1) of AEDPA. This is
because the Georgia Supreme Court's finding violated clearly estab-
lished federal law by sentencing an innocent person to death.
Until Davis, courts only dealt with this issue in hypothetical terms
as in Herrera because they did not fathom that, absent constitutional
error, a petitioner could be factually innocent. Nonetheless, at no time in
a majority opinion has a court claimed that it would be constitutionally
sound to execute an innocent human being.'59 The majority opinion in
Herrera stated arguendo that if a defendant did state a truly persuasive
claim of actual innocence, then it would render his execution unconstitu-
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
156. See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 2-3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 431-35 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the execution of an innocent person violates the Eighth Amendment and any standard of
decency); In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 829 (1 1th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting) ( "[lit is absurd
to suggest that executing a person for a crime of which he is innocent does not amount to cruel
and unusual punishment.").
158. In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 830 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
159. See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has
"repeatedly" left unresolved the question of whether the Constitution forbids execution of a
defendant who is "actually" innocent); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 427 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("First
is what the Court does not hold. Nowhere does the Court state that the Constitution permits the
execution of an actually innocent person.").
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tional.' 6° Herrera simply did not make a truly persuasive claim of actual
innocence. The Court in Herrera stated as follows:
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this case,
that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of "actual inno-
cence" made after trial would render the execution of a defendant
unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no
state avenue open to process such a claim. But because of the very
disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would
have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous bur-
den that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would
place on the States, the threshold showing for such an assumed right
would necessarily be extraordinarily high.' 6 '
The Herrera Court framed this issue as a hypothetical and went on
to hold that in any event, the defendant's claim fell "far short of any
such threshold."' 62 Justice Scalia regarded the issue of a freestanding
claim to actual innocence that would meet the "extraordinarily high"
threshold as "embarrassing."' 63 Additionally, by the language of his
concurrence, Justice Scalia seemed doubtful that the Court would ever
encounter the issue again."6 The Court in Herrera stated that "[c]laims
of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never
been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an indepen-
dent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal
proceeding."'' 65 Courts maintain that "the existence merely of newly dis-
covered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground
for relief on federal habeas corpus."' 16 6 This reflects federal habeas
courts limiting their role in ensuring that the Constitution is not violated
and in correcting errors of fact. We must assume that this does not imply
that the legislature and courts posit that an error of fact should not be
judicially corrected, but rather that errors of fact will be naturally cor-
rected if constitutional errors are remedied. However, there are large
numbers of incarcerated innocent individuals. Moreover, the number of
individuals who had constitutionally adequate trials and appeals in state
court is undoubtedly also substantial. To assert otherwise defies logic.
Federal habeas courts give great deference to state courts' assess-
160. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring).
164. See id. ("With any luck, we shall avoid ever having to face this embarrassing question
again, since it is improbable that evidence of innocence as convincing as today's opinion requires
would fail to produce an executive pardon.").
165. Id. at 400 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
166. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
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ment of facts. 167 State legislative judgments are similarly entitled to sub-
stantial deference in the area of criminal procedure. 168 Criminal process
will be found lacking "only where it offends some principle of justice
... ranked as fundamental."' 69 Federalism issues require federal habeas
courts to defer to state court findings of fact.' 7 ° In fact, section
2254(e)(1) of AEDPA requires that a federal court presume that a state
court factual finding is correct unless the petitioner can overcome that
presumption by clear and convincing evidence.' 7 ' It is noteworthy that
this section in no way prohibits federal courts from reviewing state court
findings of fact, but places the bar very high for the petitioner to meet
the requisite clear and convincing burden to overcome the state's pre-
sumption of correctness. AEDPA further provides that a state court fac-
tual determination must stand unless the federal court determines that
the factual determination was "unreasonable."17 2 "The judicial function
is to carry out the expressed legislative will and not to improve on the
statute."' 73 The legislative intent behind AEDPA was to prevent peti-
tioners from having numerous "bite[s] of the apple."' 74
The Court in Herrera went as far as to speculate that "[flew rulings
would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for fed-
eral habeas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence."' 7 5 But
Rule 20.4(a) of the Supreme Court Rules states that writs of habeas
corpus are "rarely granted" pursuant to the court's original habeas juris-
diction.'76 In fact, freestanding claims of actual innocence on collateral
attack are quite rare. Judge Friendly has stated that "the one thing almost
never suggested on collateral attack is that the prisoner was innocent of
the crime."' 77 Admittedly, petitioners currently have no motivation to
claim actual innocence in a federal habeas petition except to unlock the
gateway to another constitutional claim. It is well settled that upon
habeas corpus the court will not weigh the evidence. 7 Federal courts
167. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2006) (mandating a presumption of correctness for state
court factual findings).
168. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 407 (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445-46 (1992)).
169. Id. at 407-08 (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 344 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
171. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see also Rice, 546 U.S. at 344 (Breyer, J., concurring).
173. 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.32 (2d ed. 2009).
174. See 141 CONG. REC. 15016, 15095 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
175. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993).
176. Sup. CT. R. 20.4(a).
177. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 145 (1970).
178. See Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 305 (1888) ("As the writ of habeas corpus does not




are concerned with finality and reducing stress on the judicial system.
Federal courts refuse to question state court factual findings or "reliti-
gate state trials." '79 "Society's resources have been concentrated at that
time and place in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility,
the question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens."'
180
Nonetheless, such limitations on access to writs of habeas corpus
and courts' concern with finality rest on the premise that the AEDPA
provisions insulate petitioners from other constitutional error or that the
AEDPA provisions provide state courts with freedom in factual decision
making, hence protecting defendants from wrongful execution and
Eighth Amendment constitutional violations. Evidently, AEDPA does
not provide adequate safeguards-unless a state court's imposition of a
death sentence (when a federal court is clearly convinced of the peti-
tioner's innocence) is considered contrary to clearly established federal
law pursuant to section 2254(d)(1). This analysis comports with both
precedent and the legislative intent of that provision.
In Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court held that the "contrary
to" language of § 2254(d)(1) would be satisfied should a state court
reach a decision opposing a Supreme Court decision made on materially
indistinguishable facts. 8 ' In Williams, the plurality stated as follows:
In sum, the statute directs federal courts to attend to every state-
court judgment with utmost care, but it does not require them to defer
to the opinion of every reasonable state-court judge on the content of
federal law. If, after carefully weighing all the reasons for accepting a
state court's judgment, a federal court is convinced that a prisoner's
custody-or, as in this case, his sentence of death- violates the Con-
stitution, that independent judgment should prevail.'
82
Certainly, this makes sense, as the federal courts are in the best position
to interpret federal law and the Constitution. In Davis, and in instances
of freestanding claims of actual innocence, the assessment as to whether
there has been a constitutional violation (specifically, of the Eighth
Amendment or of substantive due process) necessarily involves a sub-
jective assessment of facts indicating innocence. To some degree, it
entails "second guessing" the state courts' evaluation of the facts. None-
theless, such a re-evaluation is sometimes necessary to determine
whether there has been a violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amend-
ments at the state court level. Notably, should federal courts reassess
179. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §102, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2006)).
180. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
181. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
182. Id. at 389 (plurality opinion).
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state court factual findings on some denials of motions for new trials, the
state courts would be encouraged to provide more frequent evidentiary
hearings when appropriate. It is clear by any standard that Davis had
adequate new evidence to mandate an evidentiary hearing at the state
level. Had the state courts provided Davis with an evidentiary hearing in
the first instance-one way or another-his innocence issue would have
likely been resolved years ago. Either the state court would have found
his claim to be persuasive and provided him a new trial, or the hearing
would have resulted in clear documentation of exactly what the Georgia
courts did not find credible about Davis's new evidence.
Since the Georgia courts failed to provide Davis with an eviden-
tiary hearing, the U.S. district court might also find that the Georgia
Supreme Court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts pursuant to section 2254(d)(2). 83 Very little has been writ-
ten about this section of AEDPA since its inception in 1996. Surely,
given the nature and extent of Davis's new evidence, the failure of the
state court to provide him with an evidentiary hearing can be deemed an
unreasonable determination of the facts under section 2254(d)(2) of
AEDPA. The Georgia Supreme Court made a determination regarding
his life or death absent an evidentiary hearing with live testimony,
despite extensive new evidence. This is an unreasonable determination
of facts per AEDPA. This alone should be sufficient to provide the dis-
trict court jurisdiction to grant the Davis writ.
Moreover, for the district court to fail to provide a remedy to Davis
would result in a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in violation of
the Suspension Clause.' 84 The clause provides: "The privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it."' 8 5 Felker v. Tur-
pin established that, on its face, AEDPA did not restrain federal courts
such that the statute violated the Suspension Clause. 86 Further, it estab-
lished that AEDPA did not impinge upon the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to hear writs. 187 However, it would arguably constitute a
suspension of the writ in violation of the Suspension Clause if a factu-
ally innocent prisoner facing death had exhausted all state remedies and
183. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of
the claim ... resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
184. See U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
185. Id.
186. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996).
187. Id. at 660-61.
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was denied the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for a writ of habeas
under AEDPA. Such a prisoner would be incarcerated in clear violation
of the Constitution with no remedy.' 88 Clearly, executing an innocent
person violates fundamental principles of justice, fairness, and morality.
Executing an innocent person violates principles inherent in the Consti-
tution and reflected in many Amendments.189
VII. THE INHERENT RIGHT TO FREEDOM FROM
WRONGFUL EXECUTION
The first question to answer is whether it is clearly established that
it is unconstitutional to execute an innocent person. Under section
2254(d)(1) of AEDPA, if a federal court finds that a state court's deci-
sion was contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States, then it may grant a petitioner's
application for writ of habeas corpus.19 ° It follows that, if it is clearly
established by the Supreme Court that imposing the death penalty on an
innocent person violates the Constitution, then a court that imposes the
death penalty on a factually innocent person would be violating clearly
established federal law. Further, if a federal court determines that a
death-sentenced individual's habeas petition establishes his innocence,
then the federal court may find that the state court violated clearly estab-
lished federal law by sentencing an innocent person to death. Conse-
quently, the federal court would have the power to grant the petitioner's
writ of habeas corpus under section 2254(d)(1) because the petitioner is
factually innocent. This article proposes that our Constitution and com-
panion case law encompasses an inherent and fundamental right to free-
dom from wrongful execution. This right is not only clearly established,
but pervades all aspects of criminal law and is the foundation upon
which criminal law rests. Accordingly, in the event that the United
States district court finds that Troy Davis meets the threshold require-
ments of innocence, then the Georgia Supreme Court made a decision
"contrary to clearly established federal law" by sentencing an innocent
person to death.
188. See id. at 663 ("Congress made the writ generally available in all cases where any person
may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the
United States." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189. It does not, however, follow that every immoral and unfair action automatically violates
the Constitution or will meet the "contrary to ... clearly established Federal law" requirement of
AEDPA. The notion that the federal district court may find Davis's claim to innocence persuasive,
yet find no legal mechanism to permit them to act on the merits on the claim, brings to mind the
principle of legality. Nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege (i.e., no crime without law, no
punishment without law).
190. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006).
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The central purpose of any system of criminal justice is to convict
the guilty and free the innocent.' 9' In fact, our system of justice and
Constitution is framed around this fundamental concept.'9 2 The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel protects the innocent from wrongful con-
viction, incarceration, and execution.' 93 The Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation encourages truth finding to protect the innocent from
wrongful conviction, incarceration, and execution. 94 The Fifth Amend-
ment right against self-incrimination is tailored to protect the accused
from making false confessions at the hands of police badgering and to
protect the innocent from wrongful conviction, incarceration, and execu-
tion.' 95 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' due process clauses
guarantee that the accused will be free of procedural and substantive
unfairness so that the innocent will be protected from wrongful convic-
tion, incarceration, and execution. 1
96
Scholars and Justices alike observe that executing an innocent per-
son would shock the conscience. 97 Society's most closely held princi-
ples of justice rest upon the protection of the innocent. The adversary
and criminal justice system is premised on the doctrine that an individ-
ual is entitled to the presumption of innocence until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.' 98 This is to protect the innocent.' 99 Reason-
able doubt is an extraordinarily high standard; one of subjective, near
certitude of guilt.200 The justice system embraces such a high standard
despite the commonly accepted notion that the vast majority of criminal
defendants are factually guilty. In part, the reasonable doubt standard
withstands the test of time because it is essential to maintain the faith of
the community.20 ' As stated in In re Winship, "the moral force of the
criminal law [must] not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned."2 As
such, should the moral force of the criminal law turn a blind eye to
compelling claims of actual innocence, the fundamental confidence of
the community in the judiciary is at risk. If not a single innocent man
191. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975) (citing Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
192. See id.
193. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45(1963) (quoting
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
194. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
195. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456-58, 460 (1966).
196. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
197. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 419 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
198. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
199. Id. at 363-64.





feels truly free from persecution and even execution, then there can be
no true order or freedom. 0 3 Further, the reasonable doubt standard per-
sists as the fundamental principle to protect the innocent, despite the
inescapable reality that the standard will more likely acquit a number of
guilty individuals than it will convict the innocent on deontological
grounds. In other words, adherence to the standard is not outcome-
based, but dependent on fundamental principles and values. 2 4 It is right
because it is right. Similarly, it is fundamentally unjust and contrary to
the morals of society to risk the execution of a potentially innocent
human.
If a habeas petitioner presents evidence sufficient to indicate actual
innocence, it would shock the conscience of the community, and argua-
bly falls outside the category of "criminal law"; thus courts would be left
without jurisdiction to punish the petitioner. The exact definition of
"criminal law" has not been determined. Professor Hart defines criminal
law as "a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation
of the community. 2 °5 If "criminal" is defined as causing injury to soci-
ety, and an individual is actually innocent of causing any injury to soci-
ety, then the courts are without jurisdiction to impose penalty. Further,
the imposition of pain requires justification. 20 6 The judiciary fails to
legitimize the justice system when punishment is imposed with no moral
justification. Bear in mind that defendants are punished in the name of
citizens.20 7 In a society that values individual liberty, the community
demands that the punishment be fair, just, and moral. To ignore a clear
and convincing claim of actual innocence pursuant to AEDPA in an
original petition for writ of habeas corpus 208 or in a second or successive
writ of habeas corpus 209- whether or not the actual innocence claim is
attached to an independent constitutional claim-would undermine the
respect of the community in the justice system and render any current
safeguards a farce. A district court ruling in Davis that its hands are tied
203. See id. ("It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his
ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal
offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.").
204. See id. at 361-64 (discussing the strong historical foundation of the reasonable doubt
standard).
205. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958),
as reprinted in JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 3 (4th ed. 2007)
(emphasis added).
206. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) ("Unless the death penalty .. .
measurably contributes to one or both of [its social] goals, it 'is nothing more than the purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment."
(quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion))).
207. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion).
208. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).
209. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
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to act on a persuasive claim to actual innocence because such a claim is
not constitutionally cognizable would be the first step in dismantling the
elemental structure of the justice system. This is precisely because so
much of the judicial system is explicitly founded on the concept that the
innocent shall be protected from harm. To be free from wrongful execu-
tion is a fundamental right that is constitutionally clear, established, and
expected.
VIII. EXECUTION OF A PERSON WITH A PERSUASIVE CLAIM TO
INNOCENCE VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Although it is clear that the justice system is founded on the con-
cept of protecting the innocent from wrongful conviction and execution,
it provides clarity and efficiency to provide this fundamental right a
home within the Constitution. The obvious residence for the right to be
free from wrongful executions is the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth
Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.2 ° The full text of
the Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."'2 1' The Eighth Amendment was originally drafted to protect
against torture and other barbaric methods of punishment.212 However,
the Amendment has been "interpreted in a flexible and dynamic man-
ner" to reflect evolving standards of decency. 213 Assessment of these
standards of decency involves a judgment of the public attitude with
reference to a given sanction. Importantly, the penalty "must accord with
'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment.'1, 214 We can hardly imagine a punishment more offensive
to the dignity of man than wrongful execution of an innocent person.
The death penalty must not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious
manner or it violates the Eighth Amendment.2 15 In making this determi-
nation, courts look to whether imposition of the death penalty will fur-
ther the social goals of capital punishment. 16 In Gregg v. Georgia,
when the Supreme Court of the United States found that the death pen-
alty was not per se unconstitutional, the Court nonetheless required that
the death penalty must meet certain social goals to be implemented. 217
210. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
211. Id.
212. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169-70 (plurality opinion).
213. Id. at 171.
214. Id. at 173 (emphasis added) (quoting Trop v. Dulles 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
215. Id. at 188-89 (discussing the holding of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
216. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
217. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, 186-87 (plurality opinion).
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Those social goals are deterrence and retribution.21 8
In Coker v. Georgia, a plurality of the Supreme Court found that
imposition of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman violated
the Eighth Amendment.219 It stated that, under Gregg, the death penalty
is excessive punishment if it: (1) makes no measurable contribution to
the acceptable social goals of the death penalty; or (2) is grossly dispro-
portionate to the severity of the crime.220 A punishment might fail the
test on either prong. 22' "[A]ttention must be given to the public attitudes
concerning a particular sentence-history and precedent, legislative atti-
tudes, and the response of juries reflected in their sentencing decisions
are to be consulted. 222
In Enmund v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that imposition of
the death penalty for a defendant found guilty of vicarious felony mur-
der violated the Eighth Amendment.223 In making this finding, the Court
focused on the moral culpability of the defendant: "As was said of the
crime of rape in Coker, we have the abiding conviction that the death
penalty, which is 'unique in its severity and irrevocability,' is an exces-
sive penalty for the [vicarious felony murderer] who, as such, does not
take human life."1224 The majority stressed that the focus in death penalty
cases must be on individual culpability. 225 Here, the petitioner was
plainly less culpable than those who actually killed the victims.
226
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court found that the execution of
mentally retarded individuals violates the Eighth Amendment.227 The
Atkins majority questioned whether executing a mentally retarded indi-
vidual would further the purposes of the death penalty.228 It asked: (1)
would it promote deterrence; and (2) would it affect the goal of retribu-
tion? 229 The majority reasoned that because mentally retarded persons
have a diminished mental capacity, executing them would not measura-
bly deter them from committing such offenses.230 Therefore, the goal of
deterrence would not be met by execution. 23' Retribution relies on the
218. Id. at 183.
219. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
220. Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. 153).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
224. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187).
225. Id. at 798.
226. Id.
227. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
228. See id. at 318-20.
229. See id. at 319-20.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 320.
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moral desert of the offender to justify punishment.232 A mentally handi-
capped individual by nature has a diminished moral culpability; there-
fore, justification for execution is considerably reduced. 233 Thus, the
majority concluded that the execution of mentally retarded offenders
would not measurably further the deterrent or retributive purposes of the
death penalty.234 So, it would be "nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering. '235 Coker, Enmund, and
Atkins illustrate that the Eighth Amendment prohibits purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering.2 3 6 Plainly, the execution of an
innocent person is purposeless and needless.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits other punishments that courts
have found to be disproportionately "needless," "arbitrary," or "exces-
sive." Roper v. Simmons prohibits the executions of juveniles under the
age of eighteen years old, citing a lack of moral culpability. 237 Kennedy
v. Louisiana prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child because
the punishment is excessive and disproportionate. 238 Furman v. Georgia
declared capital punishment (as then administered) unconstitutional as
applied in a racially discriminatory manner.239 In Graham v. Florida, the
Supreme Court will soon decide whether a life sentence for a non-homi-
cide offense committed when a juvenile was thirteen-years-old violates
the Eighth Amendment. 24° The common denominator with Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence is individual moral culpability. The unavoid-
able conclusion is that it is a flagrant violation of the Eighth Amendment
to execute an innocent person.
Even before the Eighth Amendment's call for an end to torture and
barbaric punishments, civilization embodied the value of protecting the
innocent from punishment. The Constitution has simply evolved in a
manner that the right to be free from wrongful persecution has been
specifically protected by safeguarding defendants' other freedoms and
rights. Courts attempt to insulate the accused from wrongful conviction
by protecting the accused's other basic rights. In other words, the legis-
lature and judiciary have historically functioned under the perception (or
misperception) that by shielding a defendant from constitutional errors
at trial, or misapplication of law, a just and fair verdict will necessarily
232. Id. at 319.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 321.
235. Id. at 319 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).
236. See id.; Eninund, 458 U.S. at 798; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
237. 543 U.S. 551, 570-71, 578 (2005).
238. 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2658, 2660 (2008).
239. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
240. See 982 So. 2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (2009).
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result. With advancing technology, ability to detect trial error, and
evolving standards of fairness and justice, courts are now becoming
obliged to recognize freestanding claims of innocence where the accused
may have otherwise had a fair trial.
Determining whether a petitioner has a clear and convincing claim
to innocence that rises to the level of a violation of clearly established
federal law requires a subjective assessment of facts by a federal court.
Courts must routinely interpret facts to follow the law. In McDaniel v.
Brown, the Supreme Court stated that the Nevada district court's rejec-
tion of the defendant's insufficiency of evidence claim under the Jack-
son standard was not unreasonable under section 2254(d)(1) of
AEDPA.241 The Jackson standard of review for federal habeas claims is
whether "upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier
of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 242
This standard requires the court to make an assessment of the facts of
the case. Countless other legal judgments entail judicial appraisals of
facts. For example, to determine whether an identification procedure is
reliable and therefore admissible, courts evaluate eyewitness visibil-
ity.243 To determine potential Fourth Amendment violations or Fifth
Amendment motions involving alleged police misconduct, courts assess
witness credibility. To grant or deny motions for judgments of acquittal,
courts balance and the weigh the facts. Unreasonable missteps on the
part of the court on any of these subjective interpretations of facts may
result in federal review. There is no sensible reason why claims of actual
innocence should not be subject to federal review in the same manner.
IX. WRONGFUL EXECUTIONS AS VIOLATIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS
A claim of actual innocence cannot escape a fundamental fairness
analysis. A freestanding actual innocence claim is a substantive due pro-
cess claim, as opposed to a procedural due process claim, precisely
because it is not attached to an independent constitutional error or other
mistake of law. Indeed, it is substantive because the defendant may, in
fact, be innocent despite the fact that nothing was procedurally wrong
with the case. To execute a factually innocent person would destroy our
concept of ordered liberty. Such is the heart of substantive due
process.244
241. McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665, 672 (2010) (per curiam) (referring to the standard
established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
242. Id. at 667 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324).
243. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
244. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-26 (1937), overruled on other grounds by
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
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In March 2009, in Davis v. Wilson, a Pennsylvania district court
rejected an Eighth Amendment claim based on actual innocence.
2 45
However, the court did analyze the innocence claim under the Four-
teenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive due process.2 4 6 The stan-
dard of review for a substantive due process challenge requires the
aggrieved person to establish that the action "shocks the court's con-
science. '' 24' The prisoner was incarcerated for seventy-five days but
claimed his innocence.248 The court indicated that this was potentially
"conscience shocking," in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Rather than an Eighth Amendment claim, we find that [the pris-
oner's] claim of being actually innocent of the disciplinary charge to
be really a claim that he was denied substantive due process, i.e., that
it is fundamentally unfair or conscience shocking that an innocent
inmate should be made to suffer disciplinary custody for an infraction
that he did not commit, a claim which we address below.24 9
The court went on to deny said claim and found that its conscience was
not shocked by the prisoner's seventy-five-day incarceration, despite
accepting that the prisoner was in fact innocent of the offense.25 °
Even if a court found that a seventy-five day incarceration of an
innocent person was less than conscience shocking, any rational court
should find the execution of a factually innocent person conscience
shocking. In fact, several Justices have stated just so. Justice Stevens
stated in his concurrence in the recent In re Davis opinion that "it would
be an atrocious violation of our Constitution and the principles upon
which it is based to execute an innocent person."'251 Justice Blackmun
stated in his dissent in Herrera that "[niothing could be more contrary to
contemporary standards of decency or more shocking to the conscience
than to execute a person who is actually innocent. 2 52
Similar to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, substantive due pro-
245. No. 08-589, 2009 WL 688912, at *4-5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2009). The Davis court
analyzed the Eighth Amendment issue according to the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v.
Seiter. See id. at *3-5 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991)). For a discussion of Seiter's
"deliberate indifference" standard, see infra Part X.
246. Davis, 2009 WL 688912, at *5.
247. Id. at *10 (citing Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 247 n.10 (3d Cir. 2002)); see also
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). The "shocks the conscience" standard applies to
substantive due process challenges of executive action, whereas a different standard applies to
legislative action. Davis, 2009 WL 688912, at * 10.
248. Davis, 2009 WL 688912, at *4.
249. Id. at *5.
250. Id. at *10.
251. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (quoting In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 830 (11 th Cir. 2009)
(Barkett, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).




cess jurisprudence also contains an arbitrary and capricious element.
"The reason a substantive due process claim is also called an 'arbitrary
and capricious due process claim' is because a showing that the govern-
ment has acted arbitrarily and capriciously is a prerequisite for such a
claim. ' 253 "The substantive component of the Due Process Clause limits
what governments may do regardless of the fairness of procedures that it
employs, and covers government conduct in both legislative and execu-
tive capacities. 2 54 Consequently, even where a petitioner has a constitu-
tionally and procedurally correct trial, but nevertheless has a compelling
claim to factual innocence, it would be capricious and arbitrary to imple-
ment the death penalty, or any penalty. This is true because punishment
would no longer retain moral or rational justification.
X. THE QUESTION OF INNOCENCE AND SECOND GUESSING
Petitioners filing federal habeas petitions and facing procedurals
bars may present their innocence claims procedurally by opening the
gateway under Schiup (in light of new evidence, it is more likely than
not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt).255 In a second or successive federal habeas petition,
petitioners may have their innocence claims heard substantively under
section 2244(b)(2) of AEDPA, but must show by clear and convincing
evidence that but for constitutional error no reasonable fact finder would
have found petitioner guilty.25 6 We assert that it would be constitutional
error to sentence an innocent person to death. In an original habeas pur-
suant to section 2254, the federal court must find that the state court
made a decision contrary to clearly established federal law, and show by
clear and convincing evidence that the state court decision was in
error.2 57 Again, sentencing an innocent person to death would violate the
Eighth Amendment and substantive due process, and constitute a deci-
sion contrary to federal law.
This article does not suggest that courts and judges should provide
defendants the proverbial never-ending bites at the apple or fail to pro-
vide finality to criminal cases. Nor does it suggest that errors will never
happen. It does suggest that when the consequence of those errors is the
death of an innocence person, heightened care must be taken to avoid
that consequence. Although this article suggests avenues in which
defendants may open the gateway to file federal habeas petitions, the
253. Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1374 (11th Cir. 1993).
254. Boyanowski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 2000).
255. See supra Part IV.
256. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (2006).
257. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (e)(1).
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floodgates will not be opened. Defendants now have the burden of proof
when filing writs of habeas corpus and maintain an exceedingly high
standard of proof. Very few petitioners are able to secure new exculpa-
tory evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard.258 In any event,
justice and equity demand that finality take its proper place when bal-
anced against the interests of incarcerating and particularly executing the
potentially innocent.25 9 "[I]n appropriate cases, the principles of comity
and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice must yield to
the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration. '26 ° To
better protect the innocent from wrongful conviction and minimize fed-
eral review, the judiciary should expand and improve the procedural
protections afforded an accused at trial. The earlier discussion regarding
Neil v. Biggers and suggestive identification procedures provides an
example. 26 1 The current case law, relying solely on a due process analy-
sis, allows suggestive identification procedures into evidence at trial if
the court finds the identification to be reliable. 262 This due process inter-
pretation is one cause of wrongful convictions.2 63 Other areas where
defendants' protections may be improved include providing defendants
the right to access the prosecution's biological evidence for DNA test-
ing2" and heightened standards for the admissibility of expert
testimony.
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence discusses the requirement of
deliberate indifference.265 In Wilson v. Seiter the petitioner claimed a
violation of the Eighth Amendment due to his confinement condi-
tions.266 The court held that a prisoner claiming that the conditions of his
confinement violated the Eighth Amendment must show that prison offi-
cials had a culpable state of mind.267 Specifically, the Court cited Gregg,
noting the requirement for "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
258. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995).
259. See id. at 319-21.
260. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
261. See supra Part f1.
262. See Mourer, supra note 30, at 60-61 (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114
(1977)).
263. Id. at 73 (suggesting a Fourth Amendment analysis of identification procedures, rather
than a Fifth Amendment due process analysis).
264. See Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316
(2009) (discussing numerous state and federal legislations that grant defendants access to
biological and DNA evidence).
265. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).
266. Id. at 296.
267. Id. at 297, 299.
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pain. '268 Essentially, the Court found that inadvertent infliction of need-
less pain is not unconstitutional. 269 Based on this theory, Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence dictates that arbitrary, excessive, pointless, and even
barbaric punishments are constitutional if implemented in good faith.
The justification for this rationale is that, if a punishment is meted out
inadvertently, then it is not a punishment at all. 27° "The infliction of
punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. This is what
the word means today; it is what it meant in the eighteenth century
.... "27 The prisoner in Seiter claimed an Eighth Amendment violation
based on a number of complaints regarding his confinement, including
overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, and generally inadequate facili-
ties.272 The Court remanded the case to determine whether these condi-
tions were imposed for the purposes of punishing the defendant.273
Further, the Court found that prison officials and any other government
agents implementing punishment must act with "deliberate indifference"
in order to trigger Eighth Amendment protections.274
Thus, the freestanding actual innocence claim issue is raised. Is it
fair to pose the issue as to what degree a court, jury, or any governmen-
tal body is certain of an individual's guilt or innocence? As established
above, executing a factually innocent person violates the Eighth Amend-
ment.2 75 The question arises as to what-if any-level of governmental
willfulness is required to activate Eighth Amendment protections. In this
context, it is worth noting that we are discussing the knowing execution
of an innocent person. In both In re Davis and Herrera, the issue before
the Court was whether a compelling and convincing claim to actual
innocence will state a ground for relief in a federal habeas corpus action,
absent an independent constitutional claim. 76 Consequently, the courts
ask whether or not a petitioner has grounds for relief even when the
court is convinced and consequently aware that the petitioner may be
innocent. Under AEDPA, the petitioner must show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the decision by the lower court was in error.27 7 In
essence, the federal court must be clearly convinced that the petitioner is
innocent in order to grant the writ. Certainly, implementation of the
268. Id. at 297 (second emphasis added) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)
(plurality opinion)).
269. Id. at 299.
270. Id. at 300.
271. Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985).
272. Seiter, 501 U.S. at 296.
273. Id. at 305-06.
274. Id. at 297, 303.
275. See supra Part VIII.
276. See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 397-98 (1993).
277. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii), 2254(e)(1) (2006).
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death penalty with clear and convincing belief of petitioner's innocence
would satisfy Seiter's requisite willfulness requirement and meet any
definition of "punishment" for Eighth Amendment purposes.
If society is willing to accept death as a punishment, it must accept
the subjective nature of the decision to implement the death penalty. It is
firmly established that, at the trial level, one must be found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. After the defendant has been found guilty,
he is no longer cloaked with the presumption of innocence. Even if he is
sentenced to die, a state court prisoner must prove his innocence by clear
and convincing evidence in federal court before obtaining a new trial or
evidentiary hearing pursuant to AEDPA. Given the finality of death and
the sanctity of human life, we may question: if a court merely has suffi-
cient doubts as to the guilt of a petitioner, does it not morally-if not
legally-have a duty to inquire further or provide the petitioner with an
evidentiary hearing?278
XI. DEATH Is DIFFERENT
Death is different. Dire consequences of factual error make it dif-
ferent, different because the death sentence is "unique in its severity and
irrevocability." '279 A thorough analysis of the benefits and costs of capi-
tal punishment is beyond the scope of this article. As discussed, guilt
and innocence is a subjective assessment with no foolproof method to
gauge reliability or measure outcomes. Death is permanent. Death pen-
alty cases cost seventy percent more than non-death penalty cases.2 80 If
Florida abolished the death penalty and instead instituted life without
parole, it would save fifty-one million dollars per year.28' Research
shows that the costs associated with the death penalty divert resources
from genuine crime control measures. 282 As discussed with Eighth
Amendment death penalty jurisprudence, community support for the
death penalty is an essential component for its constitutionality. 283 Pub-
lic support for the death penalty is diminishing in the United States.
Roughly half of the population now prefers life without parole over
278. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 525 N.E.2d. 5, 6 (N.Y. 1988) (stating that a trial court has a
duty of further inquiry if defendant's recitation of facts during a guilty plea casts significant doubt
upon guilt).
279. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion).
280. According to one study, the median cost of a capital case is $1.26 million, and non-death
penalty cases have a median cost of $740,000. Amnestyusa.org, Death Penalty Cost, http:ll
www.amnestyusa.org/death-penalty/death-penalty-facts (follow "Death Penalty Cost" hyperlink)
(last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
281. S.V. Date, The High Price of Killing Killers: Death Penalty Prosecutions Cost Taxpayers
Millions Annually, Palm Beach Post, Jan. 4, 2000, at IA.
282. See id.
283. See supra Part VIII.
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death as punishment for the crime of murder.2 84 Further, it is well docu-
mented that the death penalty continues to be implemented in a discrimi-
natory manner.28 . "Since 1977, the overwhelming majority of death row
defendants have been executed for killing white victims," despite the
fact that African-Americans comprise roughly half of all homicide vic-
tims. 286 Unless the conclusion is that a white person's life is more valua-
ble than a black person's life, we must conclude capital punishment is
discriminatory and arbitrary as applied. 87 A partial answer to all of
these issues is to abolish the death penalty. The issue of finality, at least
with respect to death cases, would be resolved. The valid and difficult
struggle between finality and fair review on capital cases would be
extinguished. The very real and poignant matter of the sanctity of human
life, the risk of wrongful execution, and the dignity and civility of the
justice system generally justifies critical reconsideration.
XII. CONCLUSION
The district court that will hear Troy Davis's case on remand has
already asked for briefing as to whether a freestanding claim to inno-
cence has constitutional significance.288 The court can find constitu-
tional significance specifically in the Eighth Amendment and more
broadly through substantive due process. The right against wrongful
execution is a deep-seated and inherent precept upon which the entire
justice system is built and premised.
284. Amnestyusa.org, Death Penalty Trends, http://www.amnestyusa.org/death-penalty/death-
penalty-facts (follow "Death Penalty Trends" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
285. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES
PATrERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5-6 (1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbatl I/
140845.pdf (synthesizing 28 studies and finding a "pattern of evidence indicating racial disparities
in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty"); Amnestyusa.org, Death Penalty
and Race, http://www.amnestyusa.org/death-penalty-facts (follow "Death Penalty and Race"
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 25, 2010) (citing a 2003 study and two 2007 studies which indicated
racial disparities against African Americans in death penalty cases).
286. Amnestyusa.org, supra note 285.
287. Some states are recognizing such racial disparity. Governor Beverly Perdue of North
Carolina recently signed the state's Racial Justice Act into law, concluding:
I have always been a supporter of death penalty, but I have always believed it must
be carried out fairly. The Racial Justice Act ensures that when North Carolina hands
down our state's harshest punishment to our most heinous criminals-the decision
is based on the facts and the law, not racial prejudice.
Perdue Signs Racial Justice Act, WRAL.coM, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.wral.comnewss/statel
story/5769609.
"The law allows pre-trial defendants and death-row inmates to challenge racial bias in the
death penalty system through the use of statistical studies." Death Penalty Information Center,
Gov. Perdue Signs North Carolina's Racial Justice Act-NAACP Commends Passage, http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/gov-perdue-signs-north-carolinas-racial-justice-act-naacp-commends-
passage (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
288. Myrna S. Raeder, Postconviction Claims of Innocence, CRim. JUST., Fall 2009, at 14, 21.
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Even if the district court chooses to honor the freestanding claim to
innocence, Davis still faces the high threshold standard of clear and con-
vincing evidence. The federal district court has the key to unlock the
gate to save otherwise helpless defendants with colorable freestanding
innocence claims. The gate, however, is not a floodgate. If federal courts
do not find defendants' claims to be clear and convincing, defendants
will not be entitled to hearings. In any event, if federal courts do suffer
an increased burden and realize that there are many petitioners facing
execution with unrecognized, convincing claims to innocence, then cer-
tainly the judiciary should rejoice in discovering the latent injustice.
Should such claims not surface, then no one is worse for the change.
Troy Davis stands on the edge of a decision that could revolution-
ize habeas corpus jurisprudence and expose the true degree of wrongful
convictions. Alternatively, the district court's decision could herald the
onset of the dismantling of protections for the accused and the beginning
of serious community uncertainty and lack of faith in the judicial sys-
tem. Justice Scalia's view that no innocent person can be convicted
under a cloak of fairness and constitutional perfection is contradicted by
the mere numbers of wrongful convictions. It simply defies common
sense to suggest that the judiciary does not and has not convicted and
executed innocent persons who had fair and error free trials and appeals.
Humans are imperfect, prone to mistakes and error. To err is human, to
fail to admit error is sinful.
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